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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
PAUL BUDDY ST. CLAIR, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8166 
Respondent does not controvert appellant's statement 
of facts, but it is felt that an additional statement, in narra-
tive form, will be helpful. 
That defendant killed Vesta Wittke is not seriously 
disputed. The shooting was described by an eye-witness, 
deceased's 15-year old daughter, Patricia (R. 22), and the 
attending physician testified that the gunshot wounds 
caused the death (R. 54). None of defendant's evidence 
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is contrary : defendant admitted his entry into deceased's 
bedroom (R. 111) with a gun (R. 112) and did not deny 
that he shot deceased (R. 112). The circumstances sur-
rounding the homicide however are in dispute in many 
particulars. The record supports the following general out-
line. 
Defendant became a boarder at the home of Vesta 
.Wittke in Grantsville, Utah about midsummer, 1952 (R. 
38) . The Wittke family (consisting of deceased; a daughter, 
Patricia, age 15 ; and three sons: Dayton, 20; Jack, 13; 
and Don, 9) moved to Pine Canyon, Tooele County, about 
Thanksgiving time, 1952 (R. 39). Defendant moved along 
with the family, but lived at the Wittke home only about 
a week or two thereafter (R. 21, 39, 103). Defendant at-
tempted, throughout the trial, to show that he had been 
sexually intimate with deceased in Hawaii in 1943 (R. 111), 
while boarding at her home (R. 33), and until three or four 
days before the crime (R. 107). 
During the early morning hours of July 3, 1953, about 
1 :30 a. m., deceased and defendant quarreled in the kitchen 
of deceased's home. Defendant was drunk (R. 40, 72). A 
scuffle ensued over defendant's car keys (R. 40) and de-
ceased hit defendant on the head with a poker, drawing 
blood (R. 40, 108). The lacerations required eight stitches 
(R. 139). Defendant left the house afoot, and was picked 
up by the sheriff and given a ride back to Tooele (R. 108-
109). During the ride with the sheriff, defendant threat-
ened to " ... get even with that smart little son-of-a-bitch 
Dayton; and he said there would be a payday for Vesta" 
(R. 72). 
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On the night of July 5th, Patricia slept in the same 
bed with her mother (R. 21). The front door had been 
locked with a key, the front screen door was hooked, and 
the back screen door was hooked (R. 26-27). Patricia was 
awakened about 1:30 a.m. by Vesta's scream, and saw de-
fendant shoot Vesta (R. 22). The murder weapon, a .38 
revolver, had been borrowed by defendant from an ac-
quaintance the day before, on the pretext of a target shoot-
ing match (R. 10-11). The jury could find that defendant 
entered the Wittke home by cutting through the screen of 
the back screen door and lifting the hook, since someone 
cut the screen that night (R. 68; Exhibits 6 and 7). After 
Vesta was shot, Dayton, the 20-year old son, entered the 
room and took the gun from defendant, who did not resist 
(R. 45). Dayton sent Patricia to get a gun and then to 
the neighbor's telephone (R. 24). The sheriff, and an am-
bulance, were called (R. 60, 63) . Defendant sat on a chair, 
then said to Dayton, "Go ahead and shoot me." Dayton 
pointed the revolver at defendant and pulled the trigger, 
but the gun did not fire (R. 41). Defendant then walked 
past Dayton, out to his car, and drove away; Dayton shot 
at the departing car with a .22 rifle (R. 42). 
Vesta's dying declaration to her neighbor, Bruce 
Sagers, was: "Bruce, before I pass out I would like you to 
know what Paul said to me. He come in flashed on the 
light and said 'Vesta, this is payday' and began firing at 
me" (R. 63). A somewhat similar declaration was made 
to Sheriff Gillette (R. 80). 
Vesta was removed in an ambulance and arrived at the 
Tooele Clinic about twenty minutes after the shooting at 
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1:50 a. m. in "very critical" condition (R. 53). She had 
one bullet wound in the chest and one in about the middle 
of the abdomen (R. 53-55) . Another wound was later dis-
covered in her back (R. 75). She died at 11:05 p. m. that 
day (R. 54). 
Defendant's version, briefly, is that he drove to Vesta's 
house about 10:00 p. m., pursuant to her telephoned re-
quest (R. 110). Vesta had company, so he drove on, re-
turning some time after 1 a. m. (R. 111). The door was 
not locked, defendant says, and he entered the house, went 
in the bedroom, and turned on the light (R. 111). His 
claim is that he sat on the bed (R. 118) and had a conver-
sation, with the light on, while Patricia slept (R. 112). 
The talk about "payday" was a reference to a debt of 
$150.00 Vesta owed defendant, plus $15.00 to sew up his 
head (R. 112). Vesta told defendant that there was no in-
debtedness and that defendant had been fully paid, from 
which defendant ". . . gathered I had been buying my 
favors." Defendant says he does not remember· anything 
else. "I just, I guess, I went crazy mad" (R. 112). Defen-
dant's explanation for his carrying a loaded pistol was that 
he very often carried a gun on his person (R. 113), and 
that he felt it would be protection against another beating 
(R. 125). 
The State's rebuttal was ~vidence that Vesta could not 
have telephoned defendant on July 5th at 3 p. m. as he 
claimed : she was at home all afternoon where there was 
no telephone (R. 159, 163). The Manager of the Glenwood 
Club, where defendant resided, testified that defendant re-
ceived no telephone call that day (R. 169-170). 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THERE WAS NO ERROR WITH RESPECT 
TO THE, SHERIFF'S TESTIMONY ABOUT 
THREATS MADE BY DEFENDANT; IN ANY 
CASE THE INCIDENT WAS WITHOUT PREJ-
UDICIAL EFFECT. 
POINT II. 
THE ADMISSION OF THE WITNESS SAGER'S 
TESTIMONY AS TO DECEASED'S DYING 
DECLARATION WAS NOT ERROR. 
POINT III. 
THE ADMISSION OF THE SHERIFF'S TESTI-
MONY AS TO DECEASED'S DYING DECLA-
RATION WAS NOT ERROR. 
POINT IV. 




THERE WAS NO ERROR WITH RESPECT 
TO THE SHERIFF'S TESTIMONY ABOUT 
THREATS MADE BY DEFENDANT; IN ANY 
CASE THE INCIDENT WAS WITHOUT PREJ-
UDICIAL EFFECT. 
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Defendant assigns as error an occurrence during the 
direct examination of Sheriff Gillette. It is contended that 
improper evidence of threats made by defendant were 
thereby brought before the jury. The passage complained 
of is as follows (commencing R. 72, 1. 25) : 
"Q. Did you see Vesta Wittke between the 3rd 
and 6th? 
"A. I did. 
"Q. Where did you see her? 
"A. I seen her once down town, and was called 
at least three times at the office by her, and she 
visited my home the night of the 5th, the night of 
July 5th. 
"Q. And why did she call you? 
"A. She was worried, worried about her wel-
fare and her children's welfare. 
"Q. Why was she worried? 
"MR. HANSEN: I object to it, it is immater-
ial what she told the sheriff. I move to strike the 
conversation. 
"THE COURT: The motion is denied. 
"A. She told me that she had been called at 
work several times from Paul St. Clair, at least once 
from Salt Lake by Paul St. Clair, and other times 
in which she said she had been threatened and she 
w:as agitated and worried,-and she was worried 
quite a great deal. 
"Q. Directing your attention-
"MR. HANSEN: I would like to make another 
motion that this answer be stricken, it is made by 
a declaration of the witness and not subject to cross 
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examination, and if this was a dying declaration it 
was long before the shooting. 
"MR. ANDERSON: We will join in the motion; 
it may go out. 
"MR. HANSEN: You also join in the other 
one? 
"MR. ANDERSON: We join in the other one, 
the last two answers may go out." 
It is seen that the prosecutor promptly and unequivocally 
agreed that the testimony be stricken. There was no possi.:. 
ble fairer way in which to have taken care of the matter. 
There can be no question therefore but that the jury knew 
that the testimony was not to be considered. In this respect 
they were charged (Instruction No. 13) : 
"You should not consider, or be influenced by, 
any evidence offered by not admitted, nor any evi-
dence stricken out by the court, but only such evi-
dence as has been admitted in the case. You should 
not consider, or be influenced by, any statement of 
counsel as to what the evidence is, unless they state 
it correctly, or by any statement of counsel of facts 
not shown in evidence, if any such has been made. 
You should not be influenced by any statements the 
court may have made in ruling upon questions of 
law or otherwise in your hearing, if any has been 
made, that seem to indicate any opinion upon any 
question of fact." 
In State v. Hammond, 46 U. 249, 148 P. 420, a bastardy 
case, improper evidence was received and then ordered 
stricken, the jury being instructed to disregard it. This 
procedure was held to protect defendant's rights. The same 
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principle applies here, and in this case there was no error 
with respect to this incident. 
There is further reason why the court should not per-
mit the episode outlined above to affect the appeal. The 
settled rule is that an error or defect, in order to be con-
sidered on appeal, must have had prejudicial effect. The 
rule has been applied by this court in State v. Woods, 62 
/ 
U. 397, 220 P. 215, a murder case. In State v. Hett, et al., 
64 U. 505, 231 P. 838, erroneously admitted evidence was 
held to be prejudicial as to one ·of two co-defendants on 
trial for murder, and non-prejudicial as to the other de-
fendant, whose conviction was affirmed. This rule has also 
been written by the Legislature into our Code of Criminal 
Procedure. Sec. 77-42-1, U. ·c. A. 1953, reads as follows: 
"After hearing an appeal the court must give 
judgment without regard to errors or defects which 
do not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
If error has been committed, it shall not be presumed 
to have resulted in prejudice. The court must be 
satisfied that it has that effect before it is war-
ranted in reversing the judgment." 
. When the passage is read in context it is plain that no 
damage was done defendant by the incident because there 
was already other evidence of threats made by defendant 
against the woman he murdered. Such evidence was square-
ly before the jury, without objection, prior to the incident 
complained about here. Three days before the murder, and 
after the quarrel in deceased's kitchen, defendant made 
threats against deceased and her son in the presence of the 
sheriff. The sheriff's testimony is (R. 72): 
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"A. He [defendant] told me he would get even 
with that smart little son-of-a-bitch Dayton; and he 
said there would be a pay day for Vesta. He re-
lated that she owed him some money. He had done 
a favor for her and for Dayton and there would be 
a pay day." 
Thus, before the incident here complained of, the jury 
already had before it other evidence painting a picture of 
a vengeful man sufficiently reckless to make his threats 
in the presence of the very officer of the law whose duty 
defendant knew it would be to enforce the law against him 
if he made good his threats. This incident was without 
prejudicial effect, or any effect at all, upon the result of the 
trial. 
It is further to be noted that defendant raised no ob-
jection until part of the passage here complained about was 
before the jury. The sheriff had already said, after having 
properly testified to threats, that the deceased had called 
him and "was worried" immediately before the murder. 
It must be said that this occurrence was brought about 
by defendant as much as anyone else. 
Respondent urges that this incident, looked at prop-
erly in context as against the background of the whole 
lengthy trial, is so trivial that the court should not deem it 
of any consequence. 
POINT II. 
THE ADMISSION OF THE WITNESS SAGER'S 
TESTIMONY AS TO DECEASED'S DYING 
DECLARATION WAS NOT ERROR. 
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Defendant in his Point II assigns as error the admis-
sion of a statement made by deceased after being shot. The 
testimony is that of her neighbor, Bruce Sagers,. respecting 
a declaration made by deceased. The testimony was ad-
mitted on the theory that it was a dying declaration. De-
fendant urges here that foundation was lacking. 
Murder cases involving dying declarations are num-
berless. Stated broadly, the rule is that the declaration can 
come in only if the declarant has abandoned hope of recov-
ery and believes death to be near at hand. For a general 
~tatement, see 40 C. J. S., Homicide, Sec. 290. As a predi-
cate for. the admission of the declaration, the trial court 
must find the requisite consciousness of impending death. 
Dean Wigmore's discussion of this problem is helpful. 
In V Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Ed., Sec. 1442, it is said: 
"In ascertaining this consciousness of approach-
ing death, recourse should naturally be had to all 
the attending circumstances. 
"It has been contended that only the statements 
of the declarant himself could be considered for this 
purpose; or, less broadly, that the nature of the in-
jury alone could not be sufficient, i. e., in effect, 
that the declarant must have shown in some way by 
conduct or language that he knew he was going to 
die. This, however, is without good reason. We may 
avail ourselves of any means of inferring the exist-
ence of such knowledge; and, if in a given case the 
nature of the wound is such that the declarant must 
have realized his situation, our object is sufficiently 
attained. 
"Such is the settled judicial attitude: [citing 
cases.] 
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* * * * * 
"No rule can here be laid down. The circum-
stances of each case will show whether the requisite 
consciousness existed; and it is poor policy to disturb 
the ruling of the trial judge upon the meaning of 
these circumstances." (Italics added.) 
The question here is whether, all the circumstances 
considered, the trial court could reasonably have found a 
sufficient awareness on deceased's part of her then-impend-
ing death. To make this determination, the trial court had 
the following before it: deceased had just been mortally 
shot in the middle of the chest and in the abdomen. Both 
bullets passed through her body. The doctor who examined 
her characterized her condition at 1 :50 a. m. thus (R. 53) : 
"She was in shock ; she had no palpable pulse, no blood 
pressure in the arm, her skin was cool and clammy." And 
further: "She was certainly very critical, anyone that is 
in that severe shock is in danger of losing their life at any 
time." 
As to deceased's awareness of her condition, the trial 
court had heard evidence that deceased had said to her 
daughter, after the shooting (R. 29) : "She told me not to 
~o to pieces, that I had to take care of Don [the 9-year old 
boy] ; and she told me to kiss her; and she said goodbye." 
The declaration complained of is (R. 63) : 
"She said 'Bruce, before I pass out I would like 
you to know what Paul said to me. He come in 
flashed on the light and said "Vesta, this is payday" 
and began firing at me.'" 
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Defendant relies principally upon a narrow, rigid rule 
based upon older cases. He notes that deceased asked for 
medical help, and argues from this that she entertained a 
hope of recovery. This, it is said, negates admissibility. 
Defendant finds comfort for this view in an old Kentucky 
case, Matherly v. Commonwealth (1892), 14 Ky. L. Rep. 
182, 19 S. W. 977. That case cannot be said to be good law 
at present. It is no longer the rule applied in Kentucky 
courts. In Turner v. Commonwealth, 268 Ky. 314, 104 S. 
W. 2d 1087, the Kentucky court said: 
"It is claimed that the statements of the de-
ceased are not competent as dying declarations, since 
it does not appear they were made under a sense of 
impending death. Several witnesses, including two 
or three introduced by appellant, testified that the 
deceased stated that he had been killed and requested 
that he be buried by the side of his mother. Such 
statements, coupled with the serious nature of the 
wound, indicated that the deceased was fully aware 
of his condition and was without hope of recovery. 
It is true that he expressed .a desire to be taken to 
the hospital, but this does not negative the inference 
that he was laboring under a sense of impending 
death. As was said by this court in Walls v. Com., 
257 Ky. 478, 78 S. W. (2d) 322, 323, when speaking 
of statements admitted as dying declarations: 
'These statements were not rendered inadmissible 
by showing Stevens asked for a doctor and to be 
taken to a hospital ; a man may make such requests 
in the hope of obtaining some relief from suffer-
ing.' " 
See also Bates v. Commonwealth, 307 Ky. 357, 211 S. W. 
2d 130. Another modern case in which a dying declaration 
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was admitted despite the request of deceased that a doctor 
be called is Patterson v. State, 199 Ga. 773, 35 S. E. 2d 504. 
State v. McNair, 53 U. 99, 178 P. 48, is the only Utah 
case dealing with dying declarations. In that case, the 
victim had been shot and removed to the hospital some time 
after 3 :00 p. m. He was told that he was on his deathbed. 
,He ". . . raised up in bed and said he would outlive his 
enemies." Later, however, the victim said to two persons 
that he knew he was going to die. He died at 6 :00 p. m., 
after having made a declaration about the circumstances 
of the homicide. The declaration incorporated a statement 
about his awareness of impending death._ The declaration 
was admitted as evidence. 
Taken altogether, the case for admission of the decla-
ration here is at least as strong as that presented in the 
MeN air case. The finding of the trial judge was well within 
reasonable discretion and. should not be set aside here. 
POINT III. 
THE ADMISSION OF THE SHERIFF'S TESTI-
MONY AS TO DECEASED'S DYING DECLA-
RATION WAS NOT ERROR. 
The same authorities advanced under Point II are 
apposite here. The testimony of Sheriff Gillette with re-
spect to the dy-ing declaration was not even objected to by 
defendant. Respondent is puzzled to know just what de-
fendant would have the trial court do about the situation, 
absent objection, or motion to strike, or request for an in-
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struction to disregard the testimony. At all events the evi-
dence was perfectly admissible as outlined above. 
POINT IV. 
THE VERDICT IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE. 
Defendant's final point is that the evidence does not 
support the verdict. Defendant's argument is that de-
ceased's carrying of a loaded gun at the time of his entry 
into the house is no evidence that he intended to kill de-
ceased, but should rather have been interpreted merely as 
an attempt at self-protection against Dayton, who hated 
him. 
The jury found otherwise. Under the evidence this 
is the case of a man who, having violently quarreled with 
the woman whom he later killed, borrowed a small gun, 
easily concealed on his person ; who drove, after midnight, 
to her house and broke in by the forcible cutting of a screen 
door ; who entered the bedroom and flashed on the light; 
and who then, regardless of the presence of deceased's 
daughter, fired the fatal gunshots, as he had threatened. 
From all this, the jury was not only warranted in find-
ing, but was in all conscience compelled to find, the requi-
site malice aforethought and pre-meditation. 
The verdict rendered was the only verdict possible, and 
this is so with or without the inconsequential evidentiary 
matters to which defendant has addressed his Points I, II, 
and III. Respondent believes that when this court scruti-
nizes the record as a whole there will emerge a settled con-
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viction as to defendant's guilt. In State v. Woods, 62 U. 
397, 220 P. 215, cited above, evidence that was plainly 
erroneous came before the jury. This court concluded, 
however, that the evidence of the defendant's guilt was so 
overwhelming that the result of the trial was unaffected, 
and the conviction was affirmed. The Woods case would 
clearly warrant affirmance here, particularly in view of 
the minor nature of the incidents complained of, even should 
the court conclude that there was error. This is an obvious 
case of first degree murder. It is submitted further that 
this record is singularly free of any error. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent earnestly urges that defendant had a com-
pletely fair trial, and was correctly adjudged guilty of first 
degree murder. The jury would have been wrong to have 
reached a different conclusion. The case should be re-
manded to the District Court with instructions to proceed 
in accordance with law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
JOHN W. HORSLEY, 
Assistant Attorney General. 
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